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COMMENT 
A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION: ANALYZING 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTIGATORY 
PRETEXTING UNDER THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Deputy District Attorney Mark Pautler lied. He told William 
Neal that his name was ―Mark Palmer‖ and that he was a public 
defender. This lie was not without admirable motivation; however, it 
secured the surrender of a man who allegedly killed three women 
with a wood-splitting maul.
1
 Despite the fact that Pautler‘s lies 
furthered the public‘s safety, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
determined that Pautler‘s deceit violated the Colorado Rules of 
Professional Responsibility and sanctioned him.
2
 
Attorney Stephen P. Hurley also lied. He used the services of a 
private investigator to devise a sham computer research company so 
that he could obtain access to a complaining witness‘ computer. He 
similarly had admirable motivations; he believed the computer 
contained information exonerating his client of all charges in a 
criminal case.
3
 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin not only found that 
Hurley did not violate any Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct, 
it arguably implied that he may have violated the Rules if he failed to 
lie in this situation because he would not be zealously defending his 
client.
4
 
                                                                                                                 
1 In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002). 
2 Id. at 1184. 
3 In re Hurley, No. 07 AP 478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, at *21 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008).  
4 Id. at *37 (noting the competing considerations that Hurley faced and concluding that 
not engaging in the deceit would ―hand [the client] persuasive grounds for appeal, an ethics 
complaint, and a malpractice claim‖).  
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Both attorneys utilized ―pretexting‖ to gain access to something 
desired—either the surrender of a criminal or access to information. 
―Pretexting‖ is defined differently depending on the situation, but 
generally involves disguising one‘s identity and purpose when 
approaching a target to obtain potentially significant information.
5
 
Technological advances, particularly with regard to the internet, are 
making it easier than ever for attorneys and investigators to disguise 
their identity and purpose in order to obtain potentially valuable 
information. As evidenced by In re Pautler and In re Hurley, 
however, it is not clear whether pretexting is a permissible tool under 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Bar is a self-regulated entity, charged with establishing its 
own rules of professional conduct.
6
 Pretexting is clearly not 
acceptable when it rises to the level of illegal activity, but its 
permissibility is unclear when the conduct is not criminal.
7
 Although 
some State Bar Associations have addressed this issue, many have 
not, which is surprising because pretexting implicates two competing, 
yet significant policy considerations. Supporting the use of pretexting 
is the notion that attorneys should zealously advocate their clients‘ 
positions and do everything in their power to obtain the information 
necessary to do so. Conversely, attorneys need to conduct themselves 
in a manner consistent with upholding the image of the bar. Engaging 
in deceit and misrepresentation does not improve the image of 
attorneys. Therefore, attorneys looking to gauge the potential 
implications of investigatory deceit must choose between zealous 
advocacy and the potential for sanctions without clear guidance.  
                                                                                                                 
5 See Will Hill Tankersley & Conrad Anderson IV, Fishing with Dynamite: How 
Lawyers Can Avoid Needless Problems From “Pretextual Calling,” 69 ALA. LAW. 182, 184 
(2008) (defining ―pretexting‖ as ―a simple investigative tool: The investigator approaches the 
target and, under the ‗pretext‘ of being someone else, obtains information that the target would 
ordinarily provide to such a person. It is this combination of a disguised identity and freely 
given information that makes pretexting a valuable, but potentially risky, technique.‖); David J. 
Dance, Note, Pretexting: A Necessary Means to a Necessary End?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 791, 792 
(2008) (―The investigation industry defines pretexting broadly as almost any form of deception 
employed to obtain private information.‖) (quoting Michael A. Hiltzik, State’s HP Case May be 
Tough to Win, L.A.TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at C1). 
6 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009) (noting that the ―legal profession 
is largely self-governing,‖ and that ―[a]n independent legal profession is an important force in 
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a 
profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice‖).  
7 The use of pretexting to gather certain types of information is illegal under several 
federal statutes aimed at protecting consumers. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6801 et seq. (2006), as amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (making it a crime to obtain customer 
information from financial institutions through false statements); Telephone Records and 
Privacy Protection Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. §1039 (2006) (prohibiting obtaining confidential 
phone records through the use of false or fraudulent statements, representations or documents).  
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Part I of this Comment will examine the interests courts should 
consider when addressing this issue. First, it will examine the many 
Rules of Professional Conduct potentially implicated by pretexting. 
Then it will lay out several broad trends that can be extrapolated from 
the myriad of opinions issued on this subject. Finally, it will compare 
the amendments several state bars have made to their rules in an 
attempt to provide guidance. Part II will then examine the policies 
underlying pretexting. It concludes that in weighing the competing 
considerations, the scales tip in favor of upholding the image of the 
bar and prohibiting the use of pretexting. 
I. THE CURRENT RULES: AN UTTER LACK OF GUIDANCE 
The American Bar Association (ABA) has not provided any direct 
guidance on the ethical implications of pretexting, although the 
language of several Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
―Rules‖) may be violated depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the pretexting. In lieu of clear, uniform guidance by the 
ABA, some individual state bars have dealt with the permissibility of 
pretexting on a case-by-case basis or by proactively issuing a Bar 
Opinion or amending the Bar Rules. Although very few of the cases 
and opinions directly relate to pretexting activities on the internet, 
they provide a useful view of the broader policy considerations that 
are also implicated in the internet context.  
A. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct  
Pretexting activities potentially violate the language of several 
Rules, regardless of whether the lawyer personally participates in the 
activities or merely oversees them. As explored below, nearly all 
pretexting conflicts with Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to 
Others, and Rule 8.4 Misconduct.
8
 Additionally, the circumstances 
surrounding the pretexting could implicate several other Rules. The 
most significant of these include Rule 3.7 Lawyer as Witness; Rule 
4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel; Rule 4.3 
Dealing with Unrepresented Person; and Rule 4.4 Rights of Third 
Persons.
9
 Finally, lawyers could face liability stemming from 
nonlawyer assistants‘ activities under Rule 5.3.10 It is also important 
to note that some courts broadly impose sanctions when the attorney‘s 
conduct reflects poorly on the profession, and do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1, 8.4 (2009).  
9 Id. at R. 3.7, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.  
10 Id. R. 5.3.  
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require clear violation of a rule.
11
 The fact that so many rules are 
potentially implicated indicates the risk involved in pretexting 
activities. 
The most commonly cited rule in the pretexting context is Rule 8.4 
Misconduct. The relevant text of the rule states:  
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 
so through the acts of another;  
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects;  
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.
12
 
Most significant to this situation is subsection (c) because pretexting 
necessarily involves various forms of deceit and misrepresentation. 
Additionally, Section (a) makes it clear that the lawyer cannot 
circumvent the prohibitions of the rule through the acts of another, 
which signifies that lawyers cannot rely on private investigators or 
nonlawyer assistants to obtain the information without violating the 
language of the rule.  
In addressing the implications of pretexting under Rule 8.4, some 
commentators find Comment [2] significant. It states that 
―[t]raditionally, the distinction [between permissible and 
impermissible activities] was drawn in terms of offenses involving 
‗moral turpitude.‘‖13 Therefore, ―[a]lthough a lawyer is personally 
answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be 
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those 
characteristics relevant to law practice.‖14 Some argue that the ―gloss 
on the rule‖ contained in Comment [2] should apply to the entire rule, 
not just the section on criminal liability. Therefore, ethics sanctions 
should only apply in situations that indicate a lack of moral turpitude 
                                                                                                                 
11 See, e.g., In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 482 
N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (―It is clear that this court‘s power to discipline an attorney ‗extends to 
misconduct other than professional malfeasance when such conduct reflects adversely upon the 
legal profession and is not in accordance with the high standards imposed upon members of the 
Bar‘‖ (quoting In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976))).  
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2009).  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
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rising to the level of a lack of fitness to practice law.
15
 But this 
construction ignores the introductory language of Comment [2], 
which states that ―[m]any kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on 
fitness to practice law,‖ indicating that Comment [2] applies solely to 
criminal conduct.
16
 If this construction could be successfully argued 
to a judge, however, it could have significant ramifications on the 
ability of lawyers to conduct or supervise investigations involving 
pretexting.  
Another significant provision applicable in nearly all pretexting 
situations is Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others. The 
relevant text in this Rule provides: ―In the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person . . . .‖17 Comment [1] to the Rule 
clarifies: ―A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or 
affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is 
false . . . [or] by partially true but misleading statements or omissions 
that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.‖18 It is likely 
that any misleading or deceptive statements made in the course of 
pretexting are material,
19
 so the issue under this Rule is whether they 
are in the course of representing a client. While this will depend on 
the specific circumstances surrounding the pretexting, it is likely that 
at least an argument could be made that this requirement is easily 
satisfied because the lawyer is typically engaging in pretexting 
activities to collect evidence that can be used to aid in the client‘s 
case. Even if this rule is not implicated, however, Comment [1] states: 
―For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or 
                                                                                                                 
15 See David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for 
Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the 
Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 816–18 (1995) (arguing that statutory construction principles 
―require that Rule 8.4(c) apply only to misrepresentations that manifest a degree of wrongdoing 
on a par with dishonesty, fraud, and deceit. . . . it should apply only to grave misconduct that 
would not only be generally reproved if committed by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawyer, 
but would be considered of such gravity as to raise questions as to a person‘s fitness to be a 
lawyer.‖) (emphasis in original); Barry R. Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: 
Conduct-Based vs. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2008) 
(viewing Isbell & Salvi‘s analysis to conclude that the Comment‘s ―language modifies Rule 
8.4(c), which should accordingly be read to prohibit only that dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that adversely affects a lawyer’s fitness to practice law‖ while also noting that 
several commentators disagree with this construction) (emphasis in original).  
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2.  
17 Id. R. 4.1(a).  
18 Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.  
19 See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 15, at 813 (―[T]he misrepresentations made by 
undercover investigators and testers are in fact material [because] [t]he very premise of the 
misrepresentations . . . is that the party being investigated would have spoken or acted 
differently if he or she knew the true purpose or identity of the interlocutor.‖).  
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for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of 
representing a client, see Rule 8.4‖; indicating that the pretexting 
could still violate Rule 8.4 even if Rule 4.1 is not technically 
violated.
20
  
Depending on the circumstances, the pretexting could violate 
several other Rules. If the pretexting is directed at another party in the 
matter, Rule 4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel 
(commonly referred to as the ―anti-contact‖ rule) could be implicated. 
This Rule requires:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.
21
  
The key requirements in this Rule are that the lawyer knows the party 
is represented and that the discussion is about the subject matter of 
the representation. Pretexting will likely involve the subject matter of 
the representation because the primary goal is usually to collect 
evidence against the opposing party. Since the lawyer is targeting the 
party, he is likely to know that the party is represented by counsel. 
This rule also contains a prohibition against using another person to 
communicate with the other party, so lawyers cannot use investigators 
or nonlawyer assistants to circumvent the prohibition.
22
 Although 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is significant to note that 
government lawyers likely have more leeway with investigative 
practices under this rule in some jurisdictions.
23
 
Another rule that may be implicated is Rule 4.3 Dealing with 
Unrepresented Person, which requires: 
                                                                                                                 
20 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (20).  
21 Id. R. 4.2 . 
22 Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4. ( ―Alawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule 
through the acts of another.‖).  
23 See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (―[A] prosecutor is 
‗authorized by law‘ to employ legitimate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising 
criminal investigations, and the use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will 
frequently fall within the ambit of such authorization.‖); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
4.2 cmt. 5 (2009) (―Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities 
of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to 
the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings‖). Cf. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 
1175, 1179 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting the argument that ―the Rules distinguish lawyers working in 
law enforcement from other lawyers, apart from additional responsibilities imposed upon 
prosecutors‖).  
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In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that 
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person 
misunderstands the lawyer‘s role in the matter, the lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. 
The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented 
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a 
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in 
conflict with the interests of the client.
24
 
This Rule is particularly significant because Comment [1] requires: 
―In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to 
identify the lawyer‘s client and, where necessary, explain that the 
client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person.‖25 
Pretexting necessarily involves withholding this information to obtain 
the desired evidence or information, and therefore may violate the 
rule.  
Additionally, if the lawyer personally engages in the pretexting 
activities or is present when they are taking place, he could be 
required to withdraw from representing the client under Rule 3.7 
Lawyer as Witness. This Rule directs that the ―lawyer shall not act as 
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness‖ unless certain narrow circumstances apply.26 If the 
pretexting activities become an issue at some point during the 
representation, the lawyer may be a necessary witness and will 
therefore need to end the representation. 
Finally, the pretexting activities may violate Rule 4.4 Respect for 
Rights of Third Persons if the target is not a party to the matter. The 
relevant text of this Rule requires: ―In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall not . . . use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal 
rights of such a person.‖27 The Rule recognizes that ―[r]esponsibility 
to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to 
those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer 
may disregard the rights of third persons.‖28 Therefore, any lawyer 
                                                                                                                 
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2009).  
25 Id. R. 4.3 cmt. 1. (2009).  
26 Id. R. 3.7; ee also id. R. 3.7 cmt. 2 (―The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of 
fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing 
party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party‘s rights in 
the litigation.‖).  
27 Id. R. 4.4.  
28 Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (noting that while―[i]t is impractical to catalogue all [rights of third 
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participating or overseeing pretexting needs to ensure that all rights of 
third persons are not violated.  
One final rule to note is Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding 
Nonlawyer Assistants. This Rule requires lawyers to make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that nonlawyer assistants do not engage in conduct 
prohibited by the Rules and makes the lawyer responsible for the 
person‘s conduct in certain situations.29 Therefore, the lawyer cannot 
rely on nonlawyer assistants to take actions that would violate the 
Rules if performed by the lawyer directly.  
The fact that pretexting implicates so many Rules of Professional 
Conduct mandates caution to any attorney wishing to engage in it. As 
attorneys Pautler and Hurley
30
 illustrate, however, pretexting has 
great advantages in conducting investigations. Several attorneys that 
chose to supervise or conduct pretexting activities have faced the 
possibility of sanctions, which has forced the judiciary to examine the 
propriety of the issue under the Rules. Unfortunately, very little clear 
guidance has emerged. 
B. Judicial and Bar Opinions Only Add to the Uncertainty  
Although it appears from the language of the Rules that pretexting 
activities are likely not permissible, some courts and bar associations 
recognize implicit exceptions to the rules that permit deceit and 
misrepresentation in certain narrow circumstances. Others, however, 
are not willing to recognize any exceptions, leading to extraordinary 
confusion as to whether such activity is ever permissible. Courts in 
several jurisdictions have considered the possibility of exceptions to 
the Rules when determining whether pretexting activities that have 
already occurred merit sanctions.
31
 Conversely, a number of state and 
                                                                                                                 
 
persons],‖ such rights ―include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third 
persons‖). 
29 Id. R. 5.3 (―[A] lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders 
or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a 
partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, 
or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.‖).  
30 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 439 
F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (not warranting sanctions); Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, 82 F. Supp. 
2d 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (not warranting sanctions); Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Int‘l Collectors Soc‘y, 
15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (not warranting sanctions); In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 
2002) (warranting sanctions); In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), 
aff’d, 482 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (finding censure an appropriate sanction); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 
966 (Or. 2000) (warranting public reprimand).  
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local bar associations have addressed this issue in an attempt to 
provide guidance prior to any pretexting activities occur.
32
 Although 
these opinions fail to provide a uniform analysis for determining 
whether pretexting is ever permissible under the Rules, some broad 
trends have emerged.  
Several Bar Opinions recognize that the Rules implicated by 
pretexting activities contain an implicit exception, but it is quite 
limited. Generally, the prohibitions in Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c) do not 
apply to ―misrepresentations solely as to identity or purpose and 
solely for evidence-gathering purposes‖ that do not rise to the level of 
fraud.
33
 In drawing the line between permissible misrepresentations 
and impermissible actions rising to the level of fraud, these Opinions 
focus on the ―gloss on the rule‖ contained in the Comment to Rule 
8.4.
34
 Under this analysis, pretexting will only violate the Rules when 
the conduct ―calls into question a lawyer‘s suitability to practice 
law.‖35  
Some courts use another analysis to draw the line between 
permissible and impermissible pretexting. Under this analysis, they 
examine both at the type of information gathered and how it was 
gathered. The courts permit pretexting activity primarily when 
objective information was gathered under routine circumstances.
36
 
                                                                                                                 
32 See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 323 (March 29, 2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org 
/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion323.cfm (―Lawyers . . . who act in 
a . . . manner they reasonably believe to be authorized by law do not violate Rule 8.4 if . . . they 
make misrepresentations that are reasonably intended to further the conduct of their official 
duties.‖); Phila. Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (March 2009), available at 
http://www. 
philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSReso
urces/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (holding that deceptively accessing witness‘s FaceBook and 
MySpace website is properly addressed under Rule 8.4); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 
Comm., Op. 02-05, at ¶ 2 (March 18, 2002), available at http://www.utahbar.org/rules_ops_ 
pols/ethics_opinions/op_02_05.html (―[A] governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful 
covert governmental operation . . . for the purpose of gathering relevant information does not, 
without more, violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖).  
33 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F.Supp. 2d at 475.  
34 See supra notes 13–15. 
35 D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 323 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/ 
legal_ethics/opinions/opinion323.cfm. The opinion concludes that conduct that ―cannot be seen 
as reflecting adversely on [the lawyer‘s] fitness to practice law; . . . will not violate the 
prohibition in Rule 8.4(c).‖ Id. (quoting Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1738 (2000). See also Apple 
Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (using statutory construction principles to conclude that Rule 
8.4(c) should ―apply only to misrepresentations that manifest a degree of wrongdoing on a par 
with dishonesty, fraud and deceit. . . . [I]t should apply only to grave misconduct that would not 
only be generally reproved if committed by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawyer, but would be 
considered of such gravity as to raise questions as to a person‘s fitness to be a lawyer.‖). 
36 See Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (finding no violation because ―Gidatex‘s 
investigators did not interview the sales clerks or trick them into making statements they 
otherwise would not have made. Rather, the investigators merely recorded the normal business 
routine in the Campaniello showroom and warehouse.‖); Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 
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Conversely, courts that found the pretexting activities violated the 
Rules usually analyzed conduct aimed at eliciting information that 
would not normally be divulged; frequently some kind of statement 
that can be used as an admission of guilt.
37
  
The use of pretexting in certain types of cases is more likely to be 
permissible than in others. In particular, courts are more likely to 
recognize an exception to the Rules where attorneys looking to 
enforce civil or intellectual property rights are forced to resort to 
pretexting techniques because ―it would be difficult to discover the 
violations by other means.‖38 One court noted that limiting attorneys‘ 
evidentiary techniques so as to ban pretexting ―would preclude, prior 
to litigation, the gathering of the necessary factual information to 
determine if a valid claim for relief could be maintained and in its 
most exaggerated context leave a party without a factual basis to 
assert an avenue of redress.‖39 Additionally, pretexting is likely 
permissible in situations where public lawyers are conducting official 
government investigations.
40
 The court in In re Hurley
41
 even 
                                                                                                                 
 
474–75 (noting that the prohibitions of the Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 ―cannot apply 
where lawyers and/or their investigators . . . act as members of the general public to engage in 
ordinary business transactions‖).  
37 See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1178 (finding Colorado‘s Rules of Professional Conduct 
violated where the attorney used pretexting tools to obtain the surrender of an axe-murderer); In 
re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000) (finding the rules of professional conduct violated where 
the attorney pretended to be a chiropractor to elicit statements proving fraud).  
38 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (―Undercover agents in criminal cases and 
discrimination testers in civil cases, acting under the direction of lawyers, customarily dissemble 
as to their identities or purposes to gather evidence of wrongdoing. This conduct has not been 
condemned on ethical grounds by courts, ethics committees or grievance committees.‖); see 
also Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (―[E]nforcement of the trademark laws to prevent consumer 
confusion is an important policy objective, and undercover investigators provide an effective 
enforcement mechanism for detecting and proving anti-competitive activity which might 
otherwise escape discovery or proof.‖). But see In re Gatti, at 8 P.3d at 976 (concluding that 
―[f]aithful adherence‖ to the language of the rules of professional conduct and case law ―does 
not permit recognition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or false statements.‖) (emphasis in original). 
39 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness 
First, Inc., 912 F.Supp. 502, 508 (D. Utah 1996)). In this case, ―Plaintiffs could only determine 
whether Defendants were complying with the Consent Order by calling [them] directly and 
attempting to order the Sell-Off Stamps. If Plaintiffs‘ investigators had disclosed their identity 
and the fact that they were calling on behalf of Plaintiffs, such inquiry would have been useless 
to determine [the Defendants‘] day-to-day practices in the ordinary course of business.‖ Id. at 
475. 
40 See United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 476 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (―[O]pinions of 
state and local bar associations hold [Rule 8.4(c)] do[es] not apply to prosecuting attorneys who 
provide supervision and advice to undercover investigations.‖); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 323 
(2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion 
323.cfm (concluding that, although Rule 8.4(c) does not contain an ―authorized by law‖ 
exception, there is a ―general approval of lawful undercover activity by government agents‖); 
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-05, ¶ 9 (2002), available at http://www. 
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extended the exception that was previously recognized for 
government attorneys to all attorneys in criminal cases because it 
determined that there was no support for the distinction between the 
government and criminal defense attorneys.
42
  
Conversely, other courts and bar associations refuse to recognize 
any exception to the rule, regardless of the extent of the 
misrepresentations or the type of case involved.
43
 In justifying this 
conclusion, courts point to the image of the Bar and the need to 
uphold the highest ethical standards.
44
 Additionally, several courts 
specifically uphold the prohibitions contained in the Rules for public 
attorneys conducting official government investigations.
45
 It is 
significant to note, however, that although the court in In re 
Friedman
46
 determined that the attorney violated the Rules of 
                                                                                                                 
 
utahbar.org/rules_ops_pols/ethics_opinions/op_02_05.html (concluding that a government 
attorney‘s use of pretexting ―does not violate Rule 8.4(c)‖ as long as it is part of an ―otherwise 
lawful government operation‖). But see In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1179 (finding that the Rules do 
not ―distinguish lawyers working in law enforcement from other lawyers, apart from additional 
responsibilities imposed upon prosecutors‖).  
41 No. 07AP478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, at *41 (Wis. Feb. 11, 2009). 
42 Id. at *28 (―Dane County District Attorney Brian Blanchard, who filed the grievance 
against Attorney Hurley, admitted that prosecutors frequently supervise a variety of undercover 
activities and sting operations carried out by nonlawyers who use deception to collect evidence, 
including misrepresentations as to identity and purpose. . . . but was unable to point to any rule, 
statute, ethics opinion, or Wisconsin case that drew this distinction between prosecutors and 
other attorneys.‖).  
43 See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1175; In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ill. 1979); 
In re Malone 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 482 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 
1985); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 969 (Or. 2000); Phila. Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Guidance Comm., Op. 
2009-02 (2002), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/ 
Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.  
44 E.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1176 (stating that ―members of our profession must 
adhere to the highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regardless of motive.‖); 
Id. at 1178 (―A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical 
conduct. The jokes, cynicism, and falling public confidence related to lawyers and the legal 
system may signal that we are not living up to our obligation; but, they certainly do not signal 
that the obligation itself has eroded.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
45 In re Pautler provides a shocking example of a court finding no exception to the rules 
for government attorney. The court in that case determined that a district attorney violated the 
Rules when he lied about his identity to obtain the surrender of an axe-murderer. 47 P.3d at 
1175–78. Despite the fact that the attorney used pretexting to protect the general public‘s safety, 
the court concluded that ―the Rules [do not] distinguish lawyers working in law enforcement 
from other lawyers, apart from additional responsibilities imposed upon prosecutors.‖ Id. at 
1179; see also In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (―[A] lawyer who holds public office must 
not only fulfill the duties and responsibilities of that office, but must also comply with the Bar‘s 
ethical standards‖); In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d at 1335–36 (―Decency, security and liberty 
alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are 
commands to the citizen. . . . To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end 
justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.‖ (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
46 392 N.E.2d 1333. 
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Professional Responsibility by conducting pretexting activities, it 
declined to impose any sanctions because the lack of uniformity on 
the permissibility of pretexting under the Rules afforded the attorney 
no guidance.
47
 
Although this analysis provides a rough sketch of how courts and 
bar associations view pretexting under the Rules, a large number of 
jurisdictions have yet to even address the issue. Attorneys in those 
jurisdictions have to determine whether pretexting is available as an 
investigatory tool without any guidance whatsoever from their own 
jurisdiction, and without any uniform trends in other jurisdictions. As 
technological advances improve the ability to disguise one‘s identity 
on the internet, more of these jurisdictions should consider addressing 
the issue upfront, before having to determine its merits in a sanctions 
hearing.  
C. Rule Amendments 
As lawyers have very little guidance regarding the implications of 
pretexting activities, and courts struggle to apply the Rules to 
challenged activities, several state bars have modified the language of 
the Rules to clarify the permissible scope of pretexting. For example, 
Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Oregon, and Virginia have created safe 
harbors in certain circumstances for lawyers that participate in 
pretexting activities.
48
 Additionally, New York issued a new rule to 
provide guidance as to when pretexting is permissible.
49
 Like the 
court and bar opinions previously discussed, however, there is no 
uniformity in either the scope of permissible pretexting or how the 
various bars address it in the Rules.  
Oregon, for instance, adopted a safe harbor to Rule 8.4 in response 
to the court‘s rejection of any exception to the Rules in In re Gatti.50 
The safe harbor is fairly broad, permitting lawful ―covert activity‖ in 
cases involving civil law, criminal law, or constitutional rights.
51
 
                                                                                                                 
47 Id. at 1336 (declining to impose sanctions ―[b]ecause respondent acted without the 
guidance of precedent or settled opinion and because there is apparently considerable 
belief . . . that he acted properly in conducting the investigations‖). 
48 See ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2010); FL. RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2010); IOWA RULES OF PROF‘L Conduct R. 32:8.4, cmt. 6 (2005); OR. 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009);VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009).  
49 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers‘ Ass‘n. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Form. Op. 737 (2007). 
50 Or. State Legal Ethics Comm., Form. Op. 2005-173, 481 n.1 (2005) (―Oregon RPC 
8.4(b) . . . was adopted in response to In re Gatti, in which the Oregon Supreme Court stated 
that the then-existing rules against deceitful conduct applied to all lawyers, including those in 
the public sector who engage in or supervise others in undercover investigations of illegal 
activity.‖) (internal citations omitted).  
51 OR. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009). The applicable text of the rule states: 
―[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to 
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―Covert activity‖ is defined as ―an effort to obtain information on 
unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other 
subterfuge,‖ and therefore clearly applies to pretexting.52 Pretexting 
activities may only be commenced, however, ―when the lawyer in 
good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful 
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the 
foreseeable future.‖53 In a Bar Opinion issued to clarify the changes to 
the rule, the Oregon State Legal Ethics Committee clarified: 
[I]t is evident that Oregon RPC 8.4(b) requires both an honest 
subjective belief in the possibility that unlawful activity ‗has 
taken place, is taking place or will take place in the 
foreseeable future,‘ and some rational basis for that belief. 
The rule does not encompass a good-faith belief merely in a 
‗possibility‘ of unlawful activity, but a good-faith belief in a 
‗reasonable possibility‘ of such activity.54 
Therefore, although the safe harbor applies to a broader group of 
attorneys, it may be limited by the circumstances of the particular 
case.  
The Florida Bar Association similarly added a safe harbor to Rule 
4-8.4 that permits pretexting activities in certain narrow 
circumstances.
55
 The safe harbor does not apply the Rule‘s 
prohibitions against the use of dishonesty, fraud, deceit and 
misrepresentation to a lawyer working for a criminal law enforcement 
or regulatory agency.
56
 The Rule‘s Comment clarifies the scope of the 
safe harbor: ―The exception acknowledges current, acceptable 
practices of these agencies. Although the exception appears in this 
rule, it is also applicable to Rules 4-4.1 and 4-4.3,‖ which deal with 
truthfulness in statements to others, and dealing with unrepresented 
persons.
57
 Therefore, Florida‘s safe harbor takes a narrower approach 
                                                                                                                 
 
supervise lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or 
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer‘s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules 
of Professional Conduct.‖ Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Or. State Legal Ethics Comm., Form. Op. 2005-173, 485 (2005). 
55 See FL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2010). 
56 Id. (―[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer for a criminal law 
enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise others about or to supervise another in an 
undercover investigation, unless prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be professional 
misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity other than as a lawyer by a criminal law 
enforcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an undercover investigation, unless 
prohibited by law or rule.‖).  
57 FLORIDA RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4, cmt. (2010). 
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than Oregon‘s, applying only to government lawyers as opposed to 
anyone participating in certain types of cases.  
The Alabama Bar Association chose to add a safe harbor to Rule 
3.8 Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, rather than in Rule 8.4.
58
 The 
Rule requires prosecutors to follow all rules that apply to lawyers 
generally, but then allows prosecutors to supervise activities not 
prohibited by law, as long as the lawyer does not ―personally act in 
violation of these Rules.‖59 The Rule‘s Comment clarifies that this 
safe harbor applies to pretexting activities by permitting the lawyer to 
directly participate in activities that other lawyers may participate in, 
but requires the lawyer only supervise activities that are prohibited in 
the Rules.
60
 The Comment justifies the limited safe harbor by noting 
the need to ―preserve the integrity of the profession of law.‖61 
Additionally, although the safe harbor applies only to prosecutors, an 
Alabama Ethics Opinion clarified that private attorneys in IP cases 
may participate in pretexting activities prior to filing a case.
62
 Since 
the target of the pretexting is not yet a party to any case and the 
lawyer is technically acting as an investigator as opposed to a lawyer:  
[I]n the pre-litigation context a private lawyer may use an 
undercover investigator to investigate possible infringement 
of intellectual property rights . . . and may misrepresent their 
identity and purpose as long as their contact with suspected 
                                                                                                                 
58 ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2010). 
59 Id. Specifically:  
The prosecutor shall represent the government and shall be subject to these 
Rules as is any other lawyer, except: (a) notwithstanding Rules 5.3 and 8.4, the 
prosecutor, through orders, directions, advice and encouragement, may cause other 
agencies and offices of the government, and may cause nonlawyers employed or 
retained by or associated with the prosecutor, to engage in any action that is not 
prohibited by law, subject to the special responsibilities of the prosecutor established 
in (1) above, and (b) to the extent an action of the government is not prohibited by 
law but would violate these Rules if done by a lawyer, the prosecutor (1) may have 
limited participation in the action as provided in (2)(a) above, but (2) shall not 
personally act in violation of these Rules.  
Id.  
60 ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2), cmt. (―Paragraph (2) deals with situations 
in which the ethical obligation of the prosecutor as lawyer might prevent the government from 
taking action that would not otherwise be prohibited by law.  For example, in undercover and 
sting operations, the making of false statements is the essence of the activity. . . . In order to 
make clear that the prosecutor may cause the government to act in the fight against crime to the 
fullest extent permitted to the government by existing law, paragraph (2)(a) makes clear that the 
prosecutor may order, direct, encourage and advise with respect to any lawful governmental 
action. However, where lawyers generally are prohibited by the Rules from taking an action, the 
prosecutor is likewise prohibited from personally violating the Rules.‖). 
61 Id.  
62 See Ala. State Bar Office of Gen. Counsel, Form. Op. 2007-05 (2007). 
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infringers occur in the same manner and on the same basis as 
those of a member of the general public seeking such 
services.
63
  
This opinion is specifically addressed to the IP context, however, so it 
is not clear whether it applies to private lawyers in other areas of law. 
Iowa chose to add a comment to Rule 8.4 rather than amend the 
rule itself. However, the exception to the Rule is fairly broad and 
virtually mirrors Oregon‘s safe harbor provision. It reads:  
It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients 
or others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert 
activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal 
law or constitutional rights or in lawful intelligence-gathering 
activity, provided the lawyer‘s conduct is otherwise in 
compliance with these rules.
64
  
Further, the Rule‘s Comment defines ―covert activity‖ as ―an effort to 
obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of 
misrepresentations or other subterfuge,‖ which clearly applies to 
pretexting.
65
 Like Oregon‘s safe harbor provision, the covert activity 
can only be used when the lawyer ―in good faith believes there is a 
reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking 
place, or will take place in the foreseeable future.‖66 The Comment 
applies the standard broadly to government lawyers, finding no 
violation of the Rules when the lawyer supervises or participates in 
routine law-enforcement investigations.
67
  
Finally, Virginia slightly modified Rule 8.4(c) and issued a Legal 
Ethics Opinion to clarify how the modification to the rule might affect 
pretexting activities. In 2003, Rule 8.4(c) was amended to only 
prohibit engaging in ―conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law.‖68 In a Legal Ethics Opinion, the Virginia State Bar 
Standing Committee on Legal Ethics applied this additional language 
to pretexting activities conducted by federal government lawyers and 
concluded that these activities do not reflect adversely on the lawyer‘s 
                                                                                                                 
63 Id.  
64 IOWA CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY R. 32:8.4, cmt. 6 (2005).  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. (clarifying that ―a government lawyer who supervises or participates in a lawful 
covert operation which involves misrepresentation or deceit for the purpose of gathering 
relevant information, such as law enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or an 
intelligence-gathering activity, does not, without more, violate this rule.‖).  
68 VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT. R. 8.4(c) (2009) (emphasis added).  
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fitness to practice law and therefore do not violate the rule.
69
 
Although this Legal Ethics Opinion specifically addressed 
government attorneys, it also noted that prior Virginia Legal Ethics 
Opinions provide exceptions for the use of tape recording for housing 
discrimination testers and ―the threat or actual commission of 
criminal activity where the attorney is the victim,‖ while noting that 
this list is not necessarily exhaustive.
70
 Although these exceptions 
only apply to tape-recording conversations, the Committee extended 
the exception to pretexting activities in general for government 
attorneys; therefore, it may apply to these other categories of lawyers 
as well. Since the language in the rule lacks the clarity of other Bars, 
more guidance is needed to fully understand what the boundaries of 
the exception are in Virginia.  
Addressing whether a non-government lawyer can employ the 
services of an investigator who uses dissemblance as an evidence-
gathering technique, the New York County Lawyers‘ Association 
formulated a rule to provide more guidance on the issue.
71
 The 
Association concluded that ―it is ethically permissible in a small 
number of exceptional circumstances where the dissemblance by 
investigators is limited to identity and purpose and involves otherwise 
lawful activity undertaken solely for the purpose of gathering 
evidence.‖72 In concluding that some dissemblance may be ethically 
permissible, the Association noted that anything that rises to the level 
of fraud or perjury or that violates the rights of third parties violates 
the Rules.
73
 In an attempt to provide greater guidance, the Association 
issued a rule to determine when pretexting by a non-government 
attorney is ethically permissible:  
(i) either (a) the investigation is of a violation of civil rights 
or intellectual property rights and the lawyer believes in good 
faith that such violation is taking place or will take place 
imminently or (b) the dissemblance is expressly authorized 
by law; and (ii) the evidence sought is not reasonably and 
                                                                                                                 
69 Va. Continuing Legal Educ. Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 1765 (2003) (―[W]hen an 
attorney employed by the federal government uses lawful methods, such as the use of ‗alias 
identities‘ and non-consensual tape-recording, as part of his intelligence or covert activities, 
those methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his fitness to practice law; therefore, 
such conduct will not violate the prohibition in Rule 8.4(c).‖).  
70 Id.  
71 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers‘ Ass‘n. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Form. Op. 737 (2007). 
72 Id. at 1.  
73 Id. at 2–3 (stating that ―[d]issemblance ends where misrepresentations or uncorrected 
false impressions rise to the level of fraud or perjury, communications with represented and 
unrepresented persons in violations of the Code . . . or in evidence-gathering conduct that 
unlawfully violates the rights of third parties.‖).  
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readily available through other lawful means; and (iii) the 
lawyer‘s conduct and the investigator‘s conduct that the 
lawyer is supervising do not otherwise violate the New York 
Lawyer‘s Code of Professional Responsibility (the ―Code‖) 
or applicable law; and (iv) the dissemblance does not 
unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third parties. 
Moreover, the investigator must be instructed not to elicit 
information protected by the attorney-client privilege.
74
  
While pointing out that there is no nationwide consensus on the 
ethical implications of pretexting, the Association noted that Rules 
must be ―applied in the light of reason and experience,‖ and that the 
limited use of pretexting ―is most consistent with the overall purposes 
of the Disciplinary Rules and conforms to professional norms and 
societal expectations.‖75 This opinion is specifically limited to non-
government attorneys supervising investigators, however, and does 
not address whether government attorneys may direct investigations 
by law enforcement personnel or whether attorneys may directly 
engage in pretexting activities.
76
 
Although several of these amendments and rules provide limited 
guidance on the issue, at least they provide some direction for an 
attorney analyzing his options prior to acting. This is of course 
preferable to addressing the issue after the activity has occurred 
because it provides more notice and enables attorneys to make more 
of an educated choice on the matter. One issue to note, however, is 
that every amendment or rule listed here permits pretexting; it does 
not appear that any bar prohibiting pretexting has made that clear in 
any rule. More bars should consider proactively amending the rules to 
make it clear one way or the other what is permissible. 
II. BALANCING THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:  
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY VERSUS PROFESSIONAL IMAGE 
The area of Professional Responsibility is subject to differing 
views, competing considerations, the ever-evolving public perception 
of the legal profession, and changing technology. Therefore, clear 
guidance on the subject is likely an unattainable goal. Certain issues 
within Professional Responsibility have such far-reaching 
implications, however, that they merit as much guidance as possible. 
                                                                                                                 
74 Id. at 5–6. 
75 Id. at 5. 
76 Id. at 3.  
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In its analysis of pretexting, the referee in In re Hurley
77
 noted the 
challenges facing attorneys in the criminal context: 
Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult decision, with 
concurrent and conflicting obligations: should he zealously 
defend his client, fulfill his constitutional obligation to 
provide effective assistance of counsel, and risk breaking a 
vague ethical rule that, according to the record, had never 
been enforced in this way? Or should he knowingly fail to 
represent Mr. Sussman in the manner to which he was 
entitled and hand him persuasive grounds for appeal, an 
ethics complaint, and a malpractice claim? The Sixth 
Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr. Hurley.
78
 
Although pretexting occurs in other areas of the law and does not 
always implicate constitutional rights, it has a direct impact on the 
public‘s perception of the legal profession. And as the internet has 
improved the ability to dissemble one‘s identity and purpose in 
collecting evidence, pretexting is likely to become more routine. 
Therefore, it is surprising that so many state bars have failed to 
clearly address the issue.  
Looking beyond the obvious constitutional implications, at the 
heart of the issue are the competing policy considerations. On one 
hand, lawyers are charged with zealously advocating for their clients 
within the bounds of the legal system.
79
 On the other, lawyers are 
expected to approach the practice of law in a manner that instills 
public confidence in the profession.
80
 This is why those charged with 
leading the Bar should provide guidance. The Preamble to the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct notes that when ―conflicting 
responsibilities are encountered‖ in the practice of law, they should be 
―resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral 
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.‖81 
Without adequate guidance, however, lawyers have to face two very 
significant yet competing considerations and later face the 
consequences.  
                                                                                                                 
77 No. 2007AP478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008). 
78 Id. at *36. 
79 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2009) (―As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client‘s position under the rules of the adversary system.‖).  
80 See id. at [6] (―[A] lawyer should further the public‘s understanding of and confidence 
in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy 
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.‖). 
81 Id. at [9]. 
 12/30/2010 9:43:17 PM 
2010] A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION 373 
It is clear that more guidance is needed for attorneys that wish to 
conduct pretexting activities on the internet. In analyzing the myriad 
of approaches taken by the judiciary and bar associations, several are 
clearly deficient. If there is to be adequate guidance on this issue, 
uniformity and clarity are essential to whatever standard is 
established. 
First, drawing a distinction between certain types of cases is 
nonsensical. Perhaps the use of pretexting in certain types of cases is 
easier to justify based on policy considerations, but as history shows, 
situations change. New areas of the law develop over time and 
circumstances change. Drawing a rule based on the current situation 
necessarily results in another outdated rule in the near future. 
Similarly, drawing a line based on the type of lawyer involved only 
leads to an arbitrary and unfair distinction, especially when the line is 
drawn between government and private attorneys. Permitting the 
government‘s attorney to use deceit and misrepresentation against a 
potential defendant but not permitting the defendant‘s attorney to do 
the same against potential witnesses or suspects gives the government 
an unfair advantage. If one party is permitting to engage in deceit, so 
should the other.  
Additionally, recognizing a ―gloss on the rule‖ that permits certain 
activities that seemingly violate the Rules is far too subjective to 
actually provide guidance. A lawyer who believes that his actions are 
appropriate under this standard will later be judged by someone with 
20/20 hindsight and perhaps a different set of ethical beliefs. Such a 
rule cannot possibly be applied evenly. Furthermore, this rule 
provides no guidance to the public. If a person is trying to understand 
when his Facebook page may be accessed for evidentiary purposes, 
this standard does nothing to clarify when or how pretexting may be 
utilized. Since fostering public in the legal profession is one of the 
primary public policies under consideration, this standard cannot hold 
muster.  
Finally, it is unacceptable to permit certain activities that violate 
the plain text of the Rules based on finding an ―implied‖ exception. 
This utterly fails to provide any guidance on permissible activity and 
opens the door to more egregious behavior, as lawyers may believe 
that they can justify violations of the rules by arguing that there is an 
implied exception. The language of the Rules should be the guiding 
force, without exception. If pretexting is to be permissible under the 
Rules, it should be expressly permissible. 
The remaining analysis boils down to whether pretexting should be 
uniformly permissible under the Rules, and if so, under what 
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circumstances. This can be determined by weighing the competing 
considerations: zealous advocacy versus upholding the public image 
of the bar. No clear consensus on this issue will ever be reached, but 
that is typically the case in the area of professional responsibility. In 
my view, however, the scales tip in favor of encouraging public faith 
in the bar. Although zealous advocacy is certainly necessary, and at 
times strikes at the heart of constitutional rights, our system of justice 
cannot function properly without faith in the legal profession. As 
Justice Kourlis wrote in the In re Pautler
82
 opinion:  
Lawyers themselves are recognizing that the public 
perception that lawyers twist words to meet their own goals 
and pay little attention to the truth, strikes at the very heart of 
the profession—as well as the heart of the system of justice. 
Lawyers serve our system of justice, and if lawyers are 
dishonest, then there is a perception that the system, too, must 
be dishonest.
83
  
If the rules of evidence need to be improved to provide better tools for 
discovery, then perhaps that should be addressed so that pretexting is 
not necessary. The image of the Bar cannot be improved by anything 
other than the actions of its members, however, so it must be the 
focus. 
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